James Culver v. State of PA by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-1-2011 
James Culver v. State of PA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"James Culver v. State of PA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1715. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1715 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-111        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3338 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMES L. CULVER, 




 STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, JOHN DOES 1-10 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No.10-cv-00382) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 10, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 







 James L. Culver appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s order. 
 Because the parties are well-acquainted with the background of the case, we will 
summarize it only briefly.  On February 22, 2010, Culver commenced a civil action in 
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District Court by filing a complaint in which he named the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania (“the Commonwealth”) and ten John Doe defendants.  From the allegations 
and the attached exhibits, it appears that he was involved in a state court lawsuit against 
an entity identified as Ecumenical Enterprises.  Among other things, Culver stated that 
his monthly rent was raised to an amount that he contends was above market rate, and 
that Ecumenical Enterprises received a federal subsidy that increased its monthly receipts 
to double the market rent--conduct that he believes constitutes a RICO violation.  
Concerning the state court proceedings, Culver stated that he “was served late and in 
default,” that the judge and clerk acted in conspiracy with the attorney who represented 
Ecumenical Enterprises, and that the various state offices he contacted--including the 
Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board, and the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court--all failed to assist him.  He further alleged wrongdoing by the 
Commonwealth, stating that “PA has been negligent in doing anything to right the 
wrongs of its corrupt and unethical courts, judges, and lawyers, or provide oversight for 
them. . . .  Pennsylvania has failed to properly train their judges and lawyers in proper 
administrative procedure.”  (Complaint at 2.)  Culver alleged that his civil rights were 
violated and sought damages as relief on the basis of gross negligence and conspiracy 
against the rights of citizens, 18 U.S.C. § 241.  The complaint refers to the federal RICO 
Act, various civil rights statutes, and various provisions of the United States constitution.  
On March 18, 2010, Culver filed a motion for entry of default.  On March 19, 2010, the 
assigned Magistrate Judge directed the Clerk of Court to serve Culver’s complaint and 
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motion for entry of default on the Commonwealth and directed the Commonwealth to 
respond by April 19, 2010. 
 On April 19, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with a brief in support of its 
motion.  The next day, Culver filed his second motion for entry of default.  On April 21, 
2010, the Magistrate Judge denied both of Culver’s motions for default in light of the 
Commonwealth’s response to the complaint, and the court issued a briefing schedule 
concerning the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss.  The Commonwealth filed its brief, 
asserting that Culver’s claims against it were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Culver 
filed his brief in response.  Among other things, he emphasized his allegations that the 
Commonwealth was liable for the wrongdoing of its employees and to provide redress for 
acts of negligence, conspiracies, and crimes against its citizens.  Culver also argued that 
the Eleventh Amendment was not a valid defense because it was superseded by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 The Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation that the complaint be 
dismissed.  Specifically, the Magistrate Judge determined that, to the extent that Culver 
sought federal court review of state court decisions in a lawsuit in that court, the action 
was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Also, the Magistrate Judge determined that 
the Commonwealth--the sole named defendant--was immune from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the Eleventh 
Amendment was not repealed by implication.  Moreover, the Magistrate Judge 
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determined that, to the extent that Culver intended to sue the judicial officers and staff 
involved in the state court case, or the disciplinary board officials who allegedly did not 
assist him, those defendants would be entitled to assert their respective immunities from 
suit.  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the complaint, noting 
that Culver had failed to state a viable cause of action and that further amendment of the 
complaint would be futile.  Culver filed objections to the report and recommendation, in 
which he presented several arguments concerning the procedural history in the case.  
Specifically, Culver argued that the denial of his motions for entry of default was 
erroneous, and that the Commonwealth twice improperly served him with its pleadings.  
On July 28, 2010, the District Court adopted the report and recommendation and granted 
the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the action. 
 Culver appeals.  In his notice of appeal, Culver contends that the Magistrate 
Judge’s report is “inaccurate, distorted, and erroneous,” and that the District Court did not 
consider all aspects of the complaint.  Culver does not identify any particular inaccuracies 
or omissions in particular concerning the legal merits of his claims.  Upon review of the 
record, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment, for substantially the same reasons 
set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s report.  We agree that the complaint fails to state a 
cognizable claim and that further amendment would be futile. 
 We note that Culver’s notice of appeal contains several renewed arguments 
concerning the procedural history in his case.  First, he asserts that the Commonwealth 
failed to effect proper service on him with its pleadings, that those pleadings should have 
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been considered nullities, and that the Magistrate Judge “overruled the summons and 
gave defendants 30 extra days, and after 50 days, the defendants defaulted again.”  
(Notice of Appeal (emphasis in the original).)  Culver’s position appears to be based on 
the premise that the Commonwealth was served with the summons on February 24, 2010, 
and the response to the complaint (in this case, the motion to dismiss) should have been 
filed within twenty days of that date; Culver believes that the Commonwealth was in 
default, that his motions for entry of default were erroneously denied, and that the 
Magistrate Judge erred in setting a new response date.  We discern no error in the denial 
of Culver’s motions for default.  As the Magistrate Judge explained in his March 19, 
2010 order, the document that Culver describes as a summons served on February 24, 
2010 bears proof of receipt by certified mail on that date but allows for “substantial 
doubts” regarding whether Culver had properly effected “service” of the summons on the 
Commonwealth in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.  See, e.g., 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c) and 4(j).
1
  Although Culver asserts that the Magistrate Judge’s denial 
of entry of default was based on a “hunch,” it is evident that the Magistrate Judge’s 
decision was based on the documents in the record.  
                                                 
1
 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service of a summons is governed by rules 
distinct from the rules governing service of pleadings and other papers.  For purposes of 
Rule 4, “service” of a summons is not necessarily equivalent to “mailing,” even when 
certified mail is used. 
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 After thorough review of the record, we will affirm the District Court’s order 
because this appeal does not present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4. 
